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Article: 
accuse (o'kju:s), n. The reason or grounds for imputing blameworthiness despite the absence of 
wrongdoing. 
 
Ever since J. L. Austin's famous "plea for excuses," if not before, the standard account of the distinction 
between a justification and an excuse has been this: one has a justification for what one has done just in case 
one did not do wrong in doing it; one has an excuse, just in case one lacks a justification (that is, one did do 
wrong), but is nonetheless not to be blamed for what one did.
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 There is an excuse, then, if there is reason or 
grounds for not imputing blameworthiness despite the presence of wrongdoing. There is an analogue to this 
concept of an excuse that has strangely escaped the notice of all but a few.
2
 There is no common term for this 
analogue, and so I have coined one: "accuse" (used as a noun, with a hard "s"), defined above. 
 
It may be that some people have overlooked accuses because they have reasoned as follows: the question of 
whether or not someone has an excuse arises only when it has been established that that person has done 
wrong; hence, the question of whether or not someone is to blame arises only when it has been established 
that that person has done wrong. But this is clearly fallacious; for one can be blameless in the absence of 
wrongdoing, even if one cannot properly be said to have an excuse in the absence of wrongdoing.
3 
Blamelessness is thus compatible both with the presence and with the absence of wrongdoing. We should 
take seriously the possibility that blameworthiness is likewise compatible both with the presence and with 
the absence of wrongdoing. 
 
It may be that the concept of an accuse has no application in certain contexts. Perhaps the law is such a 
context; perhaps there is some sort of incongruity in the idea of someone's being legally blameworthy (liable) 
without having committed some legal wrong (some offense). But, even if this is so, we should not take the 
concept to be inapplicable in all contexts. On the contrary, it seems to me that, in the context of morality, the 
concept is perfectly applicable. My purpose in this paper is to argue for the possibility that one be morally 
blameworthy even though one has not done anything morally wrong.
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Part I 
The sort of moral blameworthiness at issue in this context is that fundamental sort which consists in 
someone's being worthy — deserving — of being judged in a certain way. (This is often also referred to as 
moral culpability.) Such judgment is to be distinguished from any form of treatment of the person that gives 
overt expression to (and thus is founded on) the judgment, whether this treatment involves simply blaming 
the person "out loud" or something more serious, such as some sort of official censure or punishment. This 
judgment is a judgment concerning the person's moral worth. However, it is not a judgment of the person in 
toto; rather, it is a judgment of the person with respect to a certain episode in or aspect of his or her life. A 
person who is blameworthy, in the present sense, is blameworthy for something, some particular thing (such 
as an act, an omission, or some consequence of an act or omission). This thing, whatever it is, reflects ill on 
the person, and the person's moral standing is thus diminished to that extent. Moral culpability, so 
understood, is a negative form of one type of moral responsibility, its positive contrary being laudability.
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The sort of moral wrongdoing at issue in this context is that sort which it is the concern of the morally 
conscientious person to avoid. Suppose that Carl is such a person. Though conscientious, he may lack 
confidence in his own ability to discern right from wrong. For this reason, he consults Wanda, whom he 
believes to be much wiser than he in this regard. He tells Wanda that he can do either A, or B, or C, or D, but 
he's not sure which he should do. In her wisdom, Wanda tells him that she thinks he should do A. 
 
Notice — this is a crucial feature of the case — that both Carl and Wanda recognize that there is a certain 
"separation," a certain "distance," between act and agent, in the sense that, no matter how well-motivated or 
well-intentioned Carl may be, he may nonetheless do wrong. (It is precisely in order to avoid this possibility 
that conscientious people like Carl undertake their conscientious inquiries.) Indeed, the separation is "total," 
in that the sort of wrongdoing that Carl seeks to avoid is, ultimately, not a function at all of the motive from 
which or the intention with which he acts. This is not to say that some motive or intention might not be built 
into the description of some of the acts about which Carl consults Wanda. It could be that A is the act of 
obeying the speed limit out of respect for the law, whereas B is the act of obeying the speed limit out of 
prudence. If Carl is motivated both to do what the law requires and to do what prudence dictates, there seems 
to be nothing incoherent in Wanda's advising him that he should act on the former motive rather than the 
latter.
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 Nonetheless, there is a sense in which this cannot be Carl's ultimate motive when he takes Wanda's 
advice and does A. His ultimate motive has already been established by his conscientiousness; it is the 
motive of doing his duty. In taking Wanda's advice — in obeying the speed limit out of respect for the law 
— Carl is ultimately motivated by duty. (It might be thought that Carl's duty is not simply to do A but to do it 
from that sense of duty which in fact motivates his doing it. I think this must be mistaken. The argument is 
complex, however, and I relegate it to the Appendix.) 
 
In virtue of the fact that the sort of wrongdoing at issue is wholly separate from the agent, in the sense just 
explained, it seems reasonable to call such wrongdoing "objective." Sometimes more "subjective" senses of 
"wrong" are proposed. I have no quarrel with that. Sometimes, however, it is claimed that only when 
"wrong" is used in some subjective sense is it used in a "specifically moral" sense.
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 I do have a quarrel with 
that. The suggestion seems to be that, even if it is appropriate to talk of an objective sense of "wrong," it is 
not appropriate to talk of an objective sense of "moral wrong." But this cannot be right. What else is it but 
moral wrongdoing, in some sense, that the morally conscientious person is so keen to avoid? Moreover, the 
possibility of excuses rests on the possibility of there being the sort of separation between act and agent 
under discussion; only if there is such separation can it happen that wrongdoing is committed in such a way 
that it is not to be imputed to the agent. And surely the sort of wrongdoing for which one has a moral excuse 
is properly called a sort of moral wrongdoing. 
 
I do not mean to presuppose any particular account of objective moral wrongdoing here. Any account that is 
even remotely plausible will admit the possibility of excuses; any such account, I shall argue, will also admit 
the possibility of accuses. I take it that the various main versions of consequentialism and 
nonconsequentialism that have been proposed in the past are all to be understood as accounts of objective 
moral wrongdoing (and of the associated concepts of objectively morally right and objectively morally 
obligatory action). Each of these accounts admits the possibility of excuses (I may fail to achieve the best 
possible actual or probable consequences, or fail to respect someone's rights, or fail to do that act whose 
prima facie obligatoriness is most stringent, and so on, without such failure being imputable to me); each 
ought to be seen to admit the possibility of accuses. (Kant's theory may pose a problem here. Although Kant 
acknowledges that I may act in accordance with duty without such success being imputable to me, it is not 
clear that he acknowledges that I may fail to act in accordance with duty without such failure being 
imputable to me. Even if he doesn't acknowledge this, though, he should. Similarly, even if Kant wouldn't 
acknowledge the possibility of accuses, I think he should.) 
 
Part II 
Whether or not someone is morally blameworthy for something is intimately tied to whether or not he or she 
believes that he is doing objective moral wrong. The sort of independence of blameworthiness from 
wrongdoing that both excuses and accuses represent, then, is closely tied to the question whether there is an 
independence of the belief that one is doing moral wrong from one's actually doing moral wrong. 
 
There are two questions to be asked here: 
 
First Question: Can
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 one do objective moral wrong and yet not act in the belief that one is doing 
objective moral wrong? 
 
Second Question: Can one act in the belief that one is doing objective moral wrong and yet not do 
objective moral wrong? 
 
It seems plain to me that the answer to both questions is yes. Although it is only on an affirmative answer to 
the Second Question that my case for accuses essentially relies, a discussion of why the First Question 
should receive an affirmative answer may help to show why the Second Question should also receive such an 
answer. 
 
Some claim that the answer to the First Question is no, because, they say, it is a necessary, analytic truth that, 
if one does objective moral wrong, then one acts in the belief that one is doing objective moral wrong. There 
are two ways to construe such a claim: as a claim about analysis, or as a claim about synonymy. Either way, 
it cannot be accepted. 
 
A strong endorsement of this claim, understood as a claim about analysis, is to be found in the work of Galen 
Strawson, who says: "While it may perhaps be too simple, it is not in any way illegitimate . . . simply to 
define morally wrong action as action that is (i) of a certain kind . . and (ii) believed by its performer to be 
morally wrong."
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Although Strawson doesn't unequivocally embrace such an analysis (for fear it may be "too simple"), he 
clearly accepts that it would not involve any logical or conceptual incoherence (it would not be 
"illegitimate"), and it is clear from other things he says that he thinks that a belief about wrongdoing is, as he 
puts it, a "necessary constitutive condition" of wrongdoing. As I understand him, Strawson is talking here 
about objective wrongdoing, but, even if he is not, his claim is unacceptable; for it involves conceptual 
circularity. There is a constraint that any alleged analysis must meet, and it is this: if a concept F is 
constituted by, or analyzable in terms of, a concept G, then G is conceptually prior to F (that is, G can be 
grasped without F's being grasped). Strawson's claim about wrongdoing violates this constraint and is 
therefore to be rejected. It might be objected that it must be possible to grasp F (the analysandum) without 
grasping G (the analysans), for otherwise proposed analyses could never be assessed for accuracy. But this is 
beside the point. Although it surely is true that an analysandum can be grasped in some way and to some 
extent without its respective analysans being grasped, a successful analysis is one that shows that the 
analysandum is best and most fully grasped by means of grasping the analysans, and this cannot be the case if 
grasping the analysans requires grasping the analysandum; for that would be viciously circular. 
 
It might be said that the alleged analytic truth in question involves synonymy rather than analysis, but this 
too is unacceptable. If two expressions are synonymous, then what one expresses is identical with what the 
other expresses, and so what one expresses cannot be entertained without that which is expressed by the 
other being entertained. But it is clear that one can entertain the notion of one's doing moral wrong without 
entertaining the notion of one's believing that one is doing moral wrong. 
 
It might be said that the answer to the First Question is no because it is a necessary, synthetic truth that, if 
one does moral wrong, then one acts in the belief that one is doing moral wrong. Although this claim cannot 
be rejected for either of the purely formal reasons just given, it is surely highly suspect nonetheless. 
Remember that it is objective moral wrongdoing that is at issue. Anyone who believes that Adolf Hitler or 
Charles Manson or Jeffrey Dahmer did objective moral wrong (regardless of whether they believed they did) 
will want to reject this claim; and surely we should believe this. It is absurd to ascribe to agents the sort of 
moral infallibility that this claim implies they have. Hence the First Question is to be answered yes.
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Similar, but not identical, remarks pertain to the Second Question. A negative answer to this question 
requires that it be a necessary truth that, if one acts in the belief that one is doing objective moral wrong, then 
one does objective moral wrong. Clearly, just as with the obverse claim, this cannot be an analytic truth that 
involves synonymy; for the consequent of this claim can be entertained while its antecedent is not. However, 
the contention that this is an analytic truth that involves analysis cannot be dismissed on the basis that it 
would be circular, and I know of no other, purely formal reason for rejecting it. Nonetheless, we can say this. 
Inasmuch as an affirmative answer to the First Question indicates that doing wrong is to be prised loose, 
conceptually, from acting in the belief that one is doing wrong, so that the former can occur without the 
latter, it becomes difficult to see why someone should wish to insist that the latter cannot occur without the 
former. For this would involve another sort of infallibility, one that it seems equally absurd to ascribe to 
agents. If one can be mistaken in failing to believe that one is doing wrong, why can one not be mistaken (by 
virtue of an overly sensitive conscience, perhaps, or simply by virtue of a misreading of one's situation) in 
believing that one is doing wrong? 
 
Still, I can imagine someone arguing for a negative answer to the Second Question along the following lines: 
"Rule-utilitarianism (of a certain sort) is true. Moreover, it would be better in general if people acted in the 
belief that they were doing the right thing than if they acted in the belief that they were doing the wrong 
thing. Hence there is a relevant rule to this effect. Hence it is right to act in the belief that one is doing the 
right thing and wrong to act in the belief that one is doing the wrong thing." This argument rests on two very 
questionable assumptions: that rule-utilitarianism (of the sort in question) is true, and that it would be better 
in general if people acted as stipulated. But even if we grant both assumptions, the argument is unsuccessful 
in establishing a negative answer to the Second Question. For, even if it is the case that it would be better in 
general if people acted in the belief that they were doing the right thing, this is at best a contingent truth. As 
long as it does not hold of necessity, an affirmative answer to the Second Question has not been ruled out. 
 
I can also imagine someone arguing for a negative answer to the Second Question as follows: "If one acts in 
the belief that one is doing wrong, then one is thereby showing disrespect to someone, and that is wrong." 
But even if it is granted (which is again, surely, quite questionable) that it is, of necessity, wrong to show 
disrespect to someone, it is surely false that acting in the belief that one is doing wrong involves, of 
necessity, such disrespect. After all, the action that one takes to be wrong might involve, and one might 
know it to involve, no victim of disrespect at all. (One might, for example, deliberately destroy some 
beautiful object to which no one else has or ever will or can have access, believing that one is thereby 
violating some basic moral rule, but without thereby victimizing, and without believing that one is thereby 
victimizing, anyone at all.) I suppose that it might be responded that, even in such a case, one is showing 
disrespect to or for morality as such, and that this is wrong. But this simply constitutes a reinsistence on a 
negative answer to the Second Question, rather than a fresh argument for such an answer. Besides, it is 
apparent that this response fails to recognize that what is at issue is objective moral wrongdoing, in the sense 
described earlier. When consulting Wanda, Carl might tell her not only that he isn't sure which of A, B, C, 
and D to do, but also that he is currently of the somewhat tentative opinion that his doing A would be wrong. 
He would thereby be indicating both that, if he were to do A (without the benefit of Wanda's counsel), he 
would be acting in the belief that he was doing wrong, and that he recognizes that, in the sense of "wrong" at 
issue, he might nonetheless not in fact be doing wrong. It seems clear, then, that the sort of wrongdoing that 
conscientious agents like Carl are concerned with is one which requires that the Second Question be 
answered in the affirmative. 
 
Part III 
My remarks in the preceding section suffice to establish the logical independence of doing objective moral 
wrong and believing that one is doing objective moral wrong. What is crucial to my purpose here is that it be 
acknowledged that the answer to the Second Question is yes; that is, that it is possible that one believe that 
one is doing objective moral wrong without in fact doing such wrong. If it were the case that such a belief is 
sufficient for moral blameworthiness, then my case for the possibility of accuses would be complete. And the 
truth is almost that simple — but not quite. 
 
It is commonly recognized that moral blameworthiness presupposes a sort of freedom on the part of the agent 
that presumably is not required for the belief that one is doing wrong. This has been disputed on the grounds 
that it is clear that sometimes people who do not exhibit such freedom are nonetheless open to some sort of 
negative moral evaluation.
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 The proper response to this perfectly correct observation is to discriminate 
between different types of moral evaluation and to say that, while freedom is not a requirement for one's 
being morally evaluable in certain ways, it is a requirement for one's being morally blameworthy (culpable) 
for one's behavior. There is more that can be said on this issue, of course, but there is no need to take the 
matter any further here. For even granting that freedom is a necessary condition of blameworthiness, I can 
claim that accuses are possible, as long as it is accepted that acting freely in the belief that one is doing 
objective moral wrong is sufficient for being morally blameworthy for one's behavior (but not sufficient for 
actually doing objective moral wrong). This, I believe, is precisely what should be accepted.
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 But, of course, 
there are reasons for thinking that it should be rejected, and I shall now turn to some of these. 
 
We may distinguish two groups of cases. In the first group are cases where, it may seem, one acts freely and 
in the belief that one is doing objective moral wrong, but one is nonetheless not to be blamed for one's 
behavior; in the second are cases where, it may seem, one acts freely and in the belief that one is doing 
wrong and one is to be blamed for one's behavior, but one also does wrong. If all pertinent cases fall into one 
or the other of these groups, then my plea for accuses must be rejected. I shall consider examples from each 
group. 
 
For a case that falls into the first group, consider Christine, who acts freely and in the belief that she is doing 
wrong, but whose action is quite out of character. Normally she walks the straight and narrow; just this once, 
though, she breaks loose from the shackles of conscience and takes a walk down (what she regards as) some 
unseemly side-alley. Some would deny that Christine is to blame for her behavior because, they say, 
blameworthiness has to do with an imputation of fault to one's character,
13
 and Christine's character is not in 
question in this little episode. (Of course, if Christine continued to stray — made a habit of it — then that 
would be another matter.) But I see no reason to accept this claim. As explained earlier, the sort of 
blameworthiness at issue here has to do with how an agent is to be judged in light of a certain episode or 
aspect of his or her life. This is a judgment of the agent (as reflected in or by this episode or aspect); it is not 
a judgment of the agent's character. An agent's character can of course itself be a fitting object of moral 
evaluation, but this is not the same sort of judgment as that involved in evaluating the agent him- or herself. 
For, while one has a character, one is not one's character; a judgment of oneself, then, is not identical with a 
judgment of one's character. Of course, one can be blameworthy for at least some of the character traits that 
one has; this involves these traits, and to that extent one's character, reflecting ill on oneself. But this simply 
serves to dramatize the distinction between judging an agent's character and judging the agent in light of his 
or her character. And surely other things (such as Christine's decision to break loose) can also reflect ill on 
oneself, whether or not they are representative of one's character. Perhaps there is some sort of mitigation 
(either in terms of culpability or, as I believe, in terms of some other sort of negative moral evaluation) that 
is afforded by the fact that one's behavior is out of character rather than in character, but, as long as some 
degree of culpability is recognized in such cases, it must also be recognized that culpability is not necessarily 
just a matter of character-evaluation. 
 
Consider, next, Sarah, a saintly person who has overly demanding moral standards. She believes that it is her 
moral obligation to exhaust herself in the service of others, although this is in fact (let us suppose) 
supererogatory. Early one morning her alarm awakes her and, contemplating yet another exhausting day of 
labor, she collapses back into bed and decides to sleep in an extra hour, feeling guilty about doing so because 
she believes that this is the wrong thing to do. If acting freely in the belief that one is doing wrong is 
sufficient for blameworthiness, then this poor woman is to be blamed for her decision to stay in bed. But 
surely, it may be urged, she is not; hence my account is to be rejected. 
 
In response, I would make four points. First, I am assuming that Sarah is acting freely, in the requisite sense, 
when she stays in bed. There is undoubtedly an element of weakness of will operating in this sort of case, 
and, if such weakness were incompatible with the sort of freedom that blameworthiness presupposes, then 
my account would not imply that she is blameworthy after all. But it is at best an exaggeration to say that 
weakness of will eliminates freedom, and so I am willing to concede that Sarah does act freely in this 
example. Second, however, I am also willing to admit that Sarah is probably admirable in many ways: for 
her high moral standards, for her sensitivity to and sympathy with the needs of others, for the many fine 
services that she has rendered to others in the past, and so on. But all of this is quite consistent with her being 
blameworthy for her present decision to stay in bed. For, third, we must not downplay the fact that Sarah has 
indeed, on this one occasion, deliberately and freely decided to do something that she regards as wrong. This, 
I contend, is sufficient for her being culpable for the decision. The fact that we don't regard her behavior as 
wrong is of no moment; what is important is that she does so regard it and has, despite this fact, deliberately 
chosen it. Finally, recall that, in the present sense, one's being blameworthy simply involves one's being 
worthy of a certain sort of judgment. This is consistent with its being wrong for some reason to give overt 
expression to this judgment (since such expression might be misconstrued or have some other undesirable 
effect). Hence the claim that Sarah is blameworthy does not imply even that she should be blamed "out 
loud," let alone that she should be adversely treated in some more serious manner. And I am quite willing to 
concede that it may well be wrong to engage in such behavior toward such a saintly person as Sarah. 
 
As an example of a type of case where one's admirable trait is not linked to one's belief about wrongdoing, 
consider a parent, Peter, who, moved by sympathy for his child, deliberately refrains from disciplining the 
child as he thinks he ought. Or consider the case of Huckleberry Finn, who, again moved by sympathy, 
deliberately refrains from thwarting his slave friend Jim's bid for freedom as he thinks he ought. Surely, it 
may be said, blaming these people is inappropriate; hence, once again, my account is to be rejected.
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In response, I would again point out, first, that one's being blameworthy for a certain item of behavior is 
consistent with one's being admirable in certain respects; second, that it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that, in these cases, the agent is indeed doing wrong from his perspective even if not in fact; and third, 
that it might be wrong or otherwise inappropriate to treat Peter or Huck in some adverse manner, even if it is 
not inappropriate to blame them in the relevant sense, that is, to judge them negatively. I suspect that some 
may be more inclined to blame Peter than to blame Huckleberry Finn, because they may be more inclined to 
say that Peter has in fact done the wrong thing. But this is to confuse agent-evaluation with act-evaluation, 
the very sort of confusion that invocation of the concept of an excuse (and that of an accuse) seeks to avoid. 
It might also be that some are less inclined to blame Huck because they suspect that he did not believe, deep 
down, that it was wrong to help Jim to escape. Of course, if this were in fact the case, then my account would 
not imply that Huck is to blame. But, at least as I understand Twain's intent in telling the story, this was not 
the case;
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 and so Huck is to blame. 
 
Let us turn now to a case that falls into the second group mentioned earlier. Here there will be no temptation 
to say that the agent escapes blame due to the presence of some admirable trait, for no such trait will be 
exhibited. But here, it may be thought, there is a temptation to say that the agent has acted wrongly. Suppose, 
then, that Dan, a small child, is in danger, but that Paul does not realize this. Nonetheless, Paul picks Dan up 
and runs off with him, thereby in effect rescuing Dan from danger. The reason why Paul did what he did was 
that he thought that he would thereby upset Dan, and this was what he wanted to do, despite recognizing the 
wrongness of doing it. As it happens, though, Paul has upset Dan not at all; on the contrary, Dan is 
profoundly relieved to have been rescued by Paul. 
 
Is Paul to be blamed for acting as he did? Many would say so, and my account concurs (on the assumption 
that Paul acted freely). But many would also say that Paul acted wrongly, so that this case does not support 
the possibility of accuses. This seems to me untenable. What wrong is it that Paul is supposed to have done? 
After all, he rescued Dan from danger, and this was surely the right thing to do under the circumstances. 
 
But, it may be retorted, no one wishes to blame Paul for rescuing Dan. What he is to be blamed for is his 
attempt to upset Dan, and that was wrong, even if his rescuing Dan was not. 
 
I agree that it would be misleading to say that Paul is to be blamed for rescuing Dan; for his rescuing Dan is 
not that in virtue of which Paul incurs his blameworthiness. (Similarly, it would be misleading to say that 
Sarah is to blame for staying in bed, or that Huck is to blame for helping Jim to escape.) On the contrary, it is 
the attempt to upset Dan that is the occasion of Paul's being to blame. But I deny that his making this attempt 
constituted wrongdoing on his part. As best I can tell, the inclination to say that it was wrong of Paul to make 
this attempt stems from the view that it is always wrong to attempt to do wrong—and this view is to be 
rejected. 
 
There are two ways in which to read "it is wrong to attempt to do wrong." The first is this: if one attempts to 
do something and that thing is (or would be) wrong, then one's attempt is also wrong. The second is this: if 
one attempts to do something that one takes to be wrong, then one's attempt is wrong. 
 
As to the first reading: I doubt that there are many who would want to insist that Paul would have acted 
wrongly simply in virtue of his attempting (but failing) to upset Dan, if it had been the case that he did not 
believe that upsetting Dan was wrong and, moreover, was not to be blamed for not believing this. Suppose, 
for example, that Paul had mistakenly but nonculpably believed that it was his duty to upset Dan (Dan had 
misbehaved, say, and for some reason Paul believed that his upsetting Dan would be a morally appropriate 
response to Dan's misbehavior), and that that was his reason for attempting to upset Dan. If it is admitted that 
Paul would not have acted wrongly in such a case, then the view in question is, on the present reading, to be 
rejected. 
 
As to the second reading: I doubt that there are many who would want to say that Huckleberry Finn did 
wrong — objective moral wrong — to (attempt to) help Jim to escape, or that Sarah did wrong to (attempt 
to) stay in bed an extra hour. Moreover, as noted at the end of the last section, if Carl were to do A in the 
belief that this was the wrong thing to do, that would not make his doing A wrong, in the relevant sense. Nor 
would it make his attempting to do A wrong. For suppose that, despite his belief that A is wrong, A is in fact 
what Carl ought to do. And suppose, furthermore, that he cannot do A without attempting to do it. Then, 
given that any act that is a prerequisite of an obligatory act is itself obligatory, it follows that Carl ought to 
attempt to do A.
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 Hence his attempting to do A is not wrong. Hence the view is to be rejected on this 
reading, too. 
 
It might be insisted that it is always wrong to attempt to do wrong, when this is understood in terms of a 
conjunction of the two readings just considered, that is, in terms of the attempted action's both being wrong 
and being believed to be wrong. But I know of no reason to accept the view on this "conjunctive" reading, 
once it is recognized that it is to be rejected on each of the "nonconjunctive" readings. 
 
It is worth noting also that the view that it is always wrong to attempt to do wrong is, on any reading, 
inconsistent with many prominent theories of what objective moral wrongdoing consists in. I won't try to 
establish this in detail here, but it will be readily acknowledged that most familiar versions of 
consequentialism and also many versions of nonconsequentialism imply that the view is false. Of course, this 
by itself doesn't show the view to be false, since the theories in question might be mistaken.
17
 But it does 
provide some further confirmation of its implausibility. 
 
Note, furthermore, that in saying that it is not necessarily wrong to attempt to do wrong, I do not mean to 
deny that there is something morally untoward about (freely) attempting to do wrong. On the contrary, there 
is always something untoward about such an attempt. According to the second reading, one is acting in the 
belief that one is doing wrong; this renders one morally blameworthy, and hence something morally 
untoward has occurred.
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 On the first reading: if one is attempting to do something that is in fact wrong but 
one is nonculpably ignorant of the fact that it is wrong, then there is no blameworthiness involved; but there 
is, of course, moral ignorance, which is morally unfortunate, and hence morally untoward. 
 
I conclude, then, that the possibility of accuses is confirmed rather than refuted by consideration of the sorts 
of cases just mentioned. 
 
Let me address, finally, two objections to my account that do not turn on a consideration of particular cases. 
The first is this. It may appear that my account collapses the distinction between one's being blameworthy 
and one's believing that one is blameworthy, for the following reason. Suppose that Alice freely performs 
some act, believing that it is wrong for her to do so. On my account, she is to blame. But, if she believes that 
it is wrong for her to do this act, then she believes that she believes this, and vice versa. Thus, if she is 
blameworthy, she believes that she is, and vice versa. But, even if we accept the principle that beliefs and 
beliefs about beliefs are equivalent in this way (and I won't question it here), this argument is fallacious. On 
my account, Alice may believe that she is doing wrong, and thus be blameworthy, without believing that she 
is blameworthy; and she may believe that she is blameworthy without being blameworthy. This is possible 
simply because Alice may not herself subscribe to my account. Of course, if Alice does subscribe to my 
account (and makes the relevant inferences), then (given both the principle about beliefs and the fact that she 
is not mistaken in believing that she is acting freely) her belief that she is blameworthy for her action cannot 
be mistaken, and her being blameworthy will suffice for her believing that she is. But this does not pose a 
problem for the account. 
 
The second objection is this. If the notion of wrongdoing with which I am concerned is, as I have claimed, 
the notion of that sort of wrongdoing that the conscientious person seeks to avoid, how can it be that 
blameworthiness is divorced from wrongdoing in the way that I allege? For isn't a conscientious person just 
as eager to avoid blameworthiness as to avoid wrongdoing? There is some confusion here. Of course, a 
conscientious person may be eager to avoid blameworthiness, although in some cases this may not be so. 
(Some conscientious people might regard such concern as sinful self-indulgence.) Moreover, I am quite 
willing to admit that a conscientious person, even if he (or she) doesn't avoid wrongdoing, will in fact avoid 
blameworthiness (as long as he is not culpable for the misguided conscience on which he acts). But none of 
this affects my case for the possibility of accuses. For what it is important to recognize is that the sort of 
wrongdoing that the conscientious person is eager to avoid is not the sort of wrongdoing that only a 
conscientious person can commit. Thus, even if a conscientious per-son seeks to avoid blameworthiness as 
well as wrongdoing, and even if he would be successful in avoiding the former if he avoided the latter, that 
does not imply that everyone who avoids the latter succeeds in avoiding the former. 
 
Part IV 
There are at least two lessons to be learned from acknowledging the possibility of there being accuses as well 
as excuses. 
 
The first lesson is this. It has recently been argued that the principle that "ought" implies "can" entails what 
Harry Frankfurt has called the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (namely, the principle that one is morally 
responsible for what one has done only if one could have done otherwise), so that it is a mistake to accept the 
former but not the latter.
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 This argument rests on the claim that there cannot be moral blameworthiness 
without moral wrongdoing. If I am correct in denying this claim, the argument collapses. This is significant 
because there is good reason to accept both that "ought" implies "can" and that Frankfurt has shown the 
Principle of Alternate Possibilities to be false. Furthermore, it is particularly important to recognize the truth 
of a certain "unifying thesis," and that is that, even if Frankfurt is right, there is nonetheless a fundamental 
common property shared by all the basic concepts having to do both with objective moral obligation 
(obligation, right, wrong) and with moral responsibility (praiseworthiness, blameworthiness), and that is that 
each of them implies "can." I have argued for this thesis elsewhere, however, and so will not pursue the 
matter here.
20 
 
The second lesson is more general and more straightforward. It is simply this: to justify an agent's actions is 
not to exculpate the agent. The failure to appreciate this fact can lead, and often does lead, to a premature 
termination of our moral inquiries. We should not think that the discovery that no wrong has been done 
justifies us in thinking that there are no further moral discoveries to be made. 
 
APPENDIX 
It was said in Section I that objective moral wrongdoing of the sort under discussion is, ultimately, not a 
function at all of the motive from which an agent acts. This is at odds with a thesis that some attribute to 
Kant and which may be put as follows: 
 
It is a necessary truth that, for any act, if it is one's moral duty to do that act, then it is one's moral duty to 
do it from the sense of duty. 
 
Many have declared this thesis to be incoherent.
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 Some have said that for that reason Kant did not accept 
it.
22
 Others have declared the thesis coherent.
23
 Much of this discussion has been both suggestive and 
obscure. Here I propose to explore the issue in my own way; it is quite possible that the points I shall make 
are those that others have taken themselves to have made.
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I shall assume that one's doing an act "from the sense of duty" is to be understood in terms of one's belief that 
it is one's duty to do it motivating one's doing it. So understood, the thesis amounts to this (call it T): 
 
It is a necessary truth that, for any act, if it is one's moral duty to do that act, then it is one's moral duty to 
do it on the basis of the belief that it is one's moral duty to do it. 
 
The issue here is: is T true?
25
 The answer is easy if the proposition is intended as analytic: no. For then it 
would involve just the same sort of incoherence (concerning either circularity of analysis or nonidentity of 
synonymous expressions) involved with responding to the First Question with a negative answer that is 
intended to be analytic. But what if the proposition is intended to be understood as synthetic? Should it then 
be accepted? 
 
The answer is again: no. There are two main cases to consider. Suppose, first, that it is one's duty to do A but 
one does not believe that it is one's duty to do A. Then, given that beliefs are at best only indirectly in one's 
control, one cannot, at least for a while, induce in oneself the belief that it is one's duty to do A.
26
 Thus one 
cannot, at least for a while, do A on the basis of this belief. Given that "ought" (or "duty") implies "can," it 
follows that it is not one's duty, at least for a while, to do A on the basis of this belief.
27
 Given T, it would 
follow that it is not one's duty, at least for a while, to do A. But this general conclusion is surely to be 
rejected. Consider again Hitler, Manson, and Dahmer and suppose (as seems plausible) that they did not 
believe that it was their duty to refrain from their heinous acts. It is surely false that they had no duty to 
refrain from these acts (even during those periods when they could not induce the relevant belief). 
 
Suppose, secondly, that one does believe that it is one's duty to do A. Then we must concede that often one 
can do A on the basis of this belief. For, contrary to what some philosophers appear to have suggested,
28
 
even if it is true that whether or not one has a certain belief is beyond one's control, whether or not one acts 
on it (whether or not the belief actually motivates one to act) when one does have the belief is, often, in one's 
control. Just how often this is so is, of course, a difficult question. It may sometimes happen that one has a 
certain belief but cannot act on it because one cannot summon it to consciousness,
29
 or because one has an 
overwhelming contrary impulse, and so on. But that one often is in control of which belief or beliefs it is that 
one acts on is pretty clear; otherwise one could never be morally responsible for one's actions, since such 
responsibility is a function of freely acting on the basis of certain beliefs.
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 And there is no reason to deny 
that, often, one belief which is such that one is in control over whether or not one acts on it is the belief that 
it is one's moral duty so to act. (For example, I may believe both that it is my moral duty to obey the law and 
that it would be prudent to do so, and yet I may deliberately choose to obey it for the former reason and not 
for the latter.) Thus in such a case we may not conclude, simply by appealing to the principle that "ought" 
implies "can," that one has no duty to do A on the basis of the belief that it is one's duty to do A. 
 
But this conclusion may be reached by another route. Let us assume, for purposes of reductio, not only that it 
is one's duty to do A, and one believes this, but also that it is one's duty to do A on the basis of this belief — 
in symbols: OA & B(OA) & OA[B(OA)]. We still need to ask: precisely what is one's belief-state when one 
has the belief in question? There are two basic possibilities. 
 
First, one may believe that it is one's duty to do A and yet not believe that it is one's duty to do it on the basis 
of the belief that it is one's duty to do it; that is: B(OA) & ~B(OA[B(OA)]). (One variation on this worth 
noting is the following: one may believe that it is one's duty to do A and believe that it is not one's duty to do 
it on the basis of the belief that it is one's duty to do it; that is: B(OA) & B~(OA[B(OA)]).) Second, one may 
believe that it is one's duty to do A in that one believes that it is one's duty to do it on the basis of the belief 
that it is one's duty to do it; that is: B(OA) & B(OA[B(OA)]). In principle, then, we have three cases to 
assess here. They may be represented as follows: 
 
1. OA & B(OA) & OA[B(OA)] & ~B(OA[B(OA)]); 
2. OA & B(OA) & OA[B(OA)] & B~(OA[B(OA)]); 
3. OA & B(OA) & OA[B(OA)] & B(OA[B(OA)]). 
 
The first case is problematic in that, according to T, one's belief-state is said to be crucial to the full 
determination of one's duty, and yet, given ~B(OA[B(OA)]), one's belief-state does not accurately reflect 
what it is that is crucial to this determination. This is odd. Why should we think that it is one's duty to act 
"from the sense of duty" when the belief in which this sense consists is uninformed with respect to what it is 
one's duty to do? 
 
The second case is odder still. Here the belief in which the sense consists is not merely uninformed but 
misinformed. 
 
The third case seems the oddest of all. T tells us that, if ever it is the case that OA, then it is the case that 
OA[B(OA)], and we are now imagining that one's belief-state is such that not only does one believe that OA 
but one believes, more particularly, that OA[B(OA)]. Here there are two possibilities for the advocate of T. 
Either he (or she) will declare that: OA[B(OA)] & ~OA[B(OA[B(OA)])]; or he will declare that: 
OA[B(OA)] & OA[B(OA[B(OA)])]. The first alternative is difficult to understand: we are being told that 
one ought to act on the basis of a certain belief but that it is not the case that one ought to act on the basis of a 
certain other belief, even though the latter belief is more precise than and, moreover, constitutes the ground 
of the former. The second alternative is unacceptable: it leads to a regress that can be halted only by adopting 
at a higher level of inquiry one of the moves deemed inadmissible at this level. One might of course deny 
that the regress needs to be halted, declaring it benign rather than vicious. But this cannot be right, for it 
involves agents having an infinite series of ever more complicated beliefs (here is a relatively low-order one: 
B(OA[B(OA[B(OA[B(OA[B(OA)DDB]) — I shall not attempt to express it in plain English!) and declaring 
that each of these beliefs is such that the agent ought to act on the basis of it. This seems clearly absurd. 
 
My conclusion is that T is to be rejected.
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